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Introduction 
The result of the June 2014 general election in Ontario was to some quite a surprise. The 
incumbent Liberal government was expected to lose, yet it reversed its fortunes and was 
re-elected. Furthermore, the narrow 53-seat Liberal minority government resulting from 
the October 2011 general election was converted into a 58-seat majority (see Table 1). 
Perhaps the two-and-a-half-year interim was filled with many political moves and events, 
some of which may have contributed to the Liberals’ 2014 win. Alternatively, the 
election result may reflect the inability of the opposition parties to secure a winning 
strategy. In particular, 2014 can be regarded as the third-straight election that the 
Progressive Conservatives squandered. Since 2007, the PCs had three elections to replace 
an embattled Liberal government. In 2014, it once again found itself on the losing end, 
and losing nine seats since 2011, arguably due to some ill-considered campaign 
announcements. The New Democratic Party, too, failed to leverage its key role in 
supporting the minority Liberals. The NDP did not lose seats, and in fact gained a 
handful, but failed to resonate with enough discontented voters to stop another Liberal 
government. 
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Table 1: Vote and seat results in 2011 and 2014 
      
 
2011 
 
2014 
 
Votes Seats 
 
Votes Seats 
Liberal 37.7% 53 
 
38.7% 58 
PC 35.5% 37 
 
31.2% 28 
NDP 22.7% 17 
 
23.8% 21 
Other 4.10% 0 
 
6.3% 0 
 
The purpose here is to shed some light to the dynamics of the 2014 election in 
order to draw some conclusions, even if only tentative, as to the factors that help explain 
the outcome of the general election. Out review begins by going back a few years to 
shortly after the 2011 election, which produced a razor-thin Liberal minority government. 
The party then pursued a change in leadership and, consequently, a change to the head of 
government. We take a brief look at the leadership campaign and the subsequent style of 
leadership of the new leader and premier, Kathleen Wynne. 
Our analysis of the 2014 election results then take into account several empirical 
dimensions. This includes a look at party platforms and the narrative that each party 
pursued. It also includes the analysis of an Ipsos survey data conducted on the day of the 
election. The survey data allows us to look at which issues were considered important 
among voters, and whether these, among other factors, help explain their vote choice. 
 
Pre-Campaign Context 
The 2011 general election returned the Liberals to government with 52 seats, one seat 
short of a majority. As described in our review of the 2011 election (Kiss, Perrella and 
Kay 2014), the Liberals had an opportunity to tilt the balance in their favour with some 
by-elections. In April 2012, long-standing MPP Elizabeth Witmer, who represented the 
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Progressive Conservatives in the seat of Kitchener-Waterloo, was offered – by Premier 
McGuinty – to become the chair of the Workplace Safety Insurance Board. This led to 
her resignation as a member, forcing a by-election for June. It seemed like a good bet 
since the Liberals in the riding normally place second behind the PCs. Alas, the by-
election did not go as the Liberals had hoped, with the NDP candidate Catherine Fife 
winning the seat with 37 per cent of votes cast, comfortably ahead of the second-placed 
Liberal candidate, who won 32 per cent of the votes. This result obviously failed to 
change the balance of power in the provincial parliament. In July, one month after the by-
election, McGuinty announced his resignation, ending a nearly 10-year run as premier. 
McGuinty’s resignation was not met with much public sadness, as polls showed 
he and his Liberal government to be very unpopular. His final years in office were 
marked with the stench of scandals. Two prominent issues that dogged McGuinty are the 
financial mismanagement of the province’s air ambulance service, ORNGE, and the 
decision to cancel the construction of gas plants in Mississauga and Oakville. 
The leadership race to succeed him as leader and, automatically, as premier of 
Ontario, attracted six candidates, most of whom had held cabinet positions. Three were 
from Toronto: Eric Hoskins, Gerard Kennedy and Kathleen Wynne. Two were from 
Mississauga: Harinder S. Takhar and Charles Sousa. The final candidate, Sandra 
Pupatello, represented a Windsor riding. 
The January 2013 convention ran through three ballots, in which the top two 
candidates were Pupatello and Wynne. The third, and final, ballot carried Wynne to the 
leadership with 57 per cent of the votes, anointing her as Ontario’s 26th premier, its first 
female premier, and the first openly gay first minister in Canada. 
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Kathleen Wynne also formed part of another historical phenomenon in Canada. 
Her ascendency to the premiership formed part of a growing list of female provincial 
premiers in power at that time, comprising Pauline Marois of Quebec, Alison Redford of 
Alberta, Christy Clark of British Columbia, Kathy Dunderdale of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, and Eva Aariak of Nunavut. She also joined a league of incumbent provincial 
governments likely to lose their next election. Many of the provincial premiers who 
assumed their high office through an internal party leadership race assumed control of a 
government increasingly unpopular with their voters. As noted above, the Ontario 
Liberals were also unpopular and facing unrelenting public criticism over some scandals 
and a perception of the party as “playing politics.” Even Wynne acknowledged this 
prospect, to a degree, and prepared for another Liberal minority government (at best!), 
going so far as to suggest that a future Liberal minority government might consider 
working with the NDP, with some suggesting a coalition. 
A coalition was not necessary, as it turns out. She led her party to a majority win. 
What we explore here are some reasons why the Liberals succeeded. As will be shown, 
the polls were not in their favour, yet they managed to turn things around. We begin our 
exploration by looking at party platforms.  
 
Platforms 
Much of the Liberal platform was telegraphed months in advance, and certainly seemed 
deliberately designed to set the party apart from the PCs, and perhaps even to capture part 
of the NDP’s electoral base. Wynne’s open conflict with Stephen Harper and his 
Conservative regime in Ottawa, particularly as it relates to certain issues such as 
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Ontario’s demand that the Canadian Pension Plan be enhanced to provide Ontarians with 
greater pension security, certainly set her apart from Conservative partisans. Her 
government’s announcement of going ahead with an Ontario pension plan, independently 
of the CPP, and her continued scuffles with the federal government, could have helped 
her party regain some respect among voters, particularly among those who did not 
support Stephen Harper. 
What is curious about Wynne’s positions is that it may be perceived as taking the 
Liberals to the left. The Liberal policy platform heavily emphasized an activist 
government. It promised a jobs and prosperity fund of $10-billion that would essentially 
provide subsidies to business to invest in Ontario. In addition, it promised a 10-year, 
$130 billion, plan to support infrastructure projects. Much of this was to be dedicated 
strictly to transit infrastructure. Lastly, it promised a new mandatory and public pension 
scheme that would imitate and supplement the Canada Pension Plan. This strategy had 
two distinct advantages. 
First, it gave Liberal politicians the opportunity to do what they love to do: travel 
through the province making promises of investment in the local areas. In Kitchener-
Waterloo, a swing riding, the Transportation Minister Glen Murray promised two-way 
all-day GO Train service to Toronto within five years (Bellemare 2014). The Minister 
also felt quite comfortable promising a high-speed rail line connecting Toronto, 
Kitchener-Waterloo and London within 10 years (Bellemare and Grant 2014). The 
Liberals were also careful to ensure their transportation plan invested funds in highway 
transportation, not just in urban districts, enabling ministers to promise the goods in other 
areas of the province as well. For example, Minister Murray promised to expand the 
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twinning of Highway 417 in the Ottawa Valley to ease traffic commutes (Arnprior 
Chronicle – Guide 2014) 
Second, it helped the party make an appeal to waffling and non-committal NDP 
voters who were both nervous of the prospect of a reenergized right-wing government 
under Tim Hudak and the Progressive Conservatives and attracted to the prospect of an 
activist government. The NDP was hit by disaster in the middle of the campaign by a 
group of prominent party notables, including the feminist writer and activist Michelle 
Landsberg, whose husband, Stephen Lewis, was a former leader of the Ontario NDP. The 
group published an open letter to party leader Andrea Horwath arguing that: “From what 
we can see you are running to the right of the Liberals in an attempt to win Conservative 
votes” (Bickerton et al. 2014). 
Third, and lastly, the Liberals had the convenient effect of moving the agenda 
away from the messy business of the party’s sordid record on gas plants and other costly 
scandals such as the E-Health record and ORNGE scandals. 
 By contrast, the Ontario PCs appeared, again, to be fighting the 1995 and 1999 
election campaigns. Namely, Hudak made fairly bold promises offering a fundamental 
shift in the provincial economy, limiting public sector activity to increase private sector 
activity. Whereas in 2011, Hudak promised to take action against foreign workers, Hudak 
raised eyebrows in 2014 by promising to eliminate 100,000 public-sector jobs. While this 
was framed in the policy platform in the context of a broader approach to fiscal policy, 
whereby reducing public sector workforce was a necessary step to reducing the deficit, 
allowing for tax cuts and thence an economic expansion, the policy was announced on its 
own. Hudak got into additional trouble with a platform promise – echoing the general 
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theme of restricting public sector activity – to end subsidies for businesses. His problem 
was that he made this promise at a number of campaign stops at businesses whose owners 
were happily taking government subsidies (Morrow 2014).  
 What led the Progressive Conservative Party to make such disastrous promises? 
Perhaps it was a calculation that there was so much antipathy to the Liberals that the 
primary goal of the campaign had to be not to chase the median voter, but to mobilize 
enough of the PC base to win. Or, perhaps, the people around Hudak were so 
ideologically committed to the mission of small government that making a bold policy 
commitment to shift the discursive terrain of provincial politics to the right must always 
be the top priority. Perhaps both interpretations are intertwined. Regardless, post-election, 
the rest of the Progressive Conservative Party was not happy with the results with many 
MPPs publicly expressing frustration at the platform, saying they were not consulted and 
rejecting Hudak from even serving as interim leader after he announced his election-night 
resignation (Leslie 2014). 
 The NDP’s platform reflected, as often, the difficult balancing act of a third-party 
with dispersed geographical support in a single-member plurality system. This alone is 
challenging enough, but in addition, the NDP faced the challenge of bridging some 
ideological divides within the party between moderate and more radical wings. Horwath 
delivered a mixed result in this campaign. Prior to the election, she mystified many and 
angered some with her position on the minimum wage, waiting until the Liberals 
committed to raising the minimum wage to $11 per hour to advocate a minimum wage of 
$14 per hour. To properly understand the political difficulty of this position, one has to 
note that this was in the context of a broad campaign by unions and anti-poverty activists 
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to raise the minimum wage to $14 per hour. Ultimately, the NDP outbid the Liberals and 
urged a $12 an hour minimum wage, indexed to inflation. But her delay angered many in 
the NDP universe. It is not new for NDP leaders to strive to reassure centrist voters to 
build a majority electoral coalition. But doing so successfully requires the artistic ability 
first to reassure the party base that the party is still on an ideological mission. At the 
federal level, Jack Layton was able to do this successfully. Andrea Horwath was not. 
Issues 
Data from the 2014 Ipsos election-day poll shows that nearly 30 percent of voters 
mentioned the economy and jobs as their top campaign issue (see Table 2a). This is 
followed, somewhat distantly, by a cluster of three other issues: healthcare; public 
finances (i.e., government debt and budget); and integrity of political/government leaders. 
Table 2a: Most important issue among voters    
      
Issue  Party supported    
 Lib. PC NDP  Total 
Jobs/Economy 32.6% 31.2% 27.3%  30.8% 
Healthcare 17.2% 5.9% 16.5%  13.0% 
Public finances 6.8% 24.6% 4.5%  12.5% 
Integrity/corruption 10.4% 18.4% 17.6%  15.0% 
Education 9.9% 0.8% 7.8%  6.1% 
Taxes 3.3% 8.2% 6.1%  5.7% 
Energy 3.2% 7.0% 7.0%  5.5% 
Transit, Roads, Transport 7.2% 1.4% 3.1%  4.1% 
Social Assistance/Pensions 6.1% 1.6% 7.1%  4.7% 
Environment 2.1% 0.5% 1.9%  1.5% 
Other 1.2% 0.6% 1.2%  1.0% 
      
Total 2991 2659 1826  7476  
Source: Ipsos Ontario 2014 Election Day Survey. 
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 Across the parties, there is not a whole lot of distance with regards to the salience 
of economic concerns. The Liberals and PCs are practically tied, with a bit more than 30 
per cent of their voters indicating economy or jobs as their top election concern. It was 
also a top concern among 27 percent of NDP voters. With regards to healthcare, the 
parties are distinguished. While 17 percent of Liberals and NDP voters cite healthcare as 
their top election issue, this was true only among 6 percent of PC voters. Even when 
considering the second-most important election issue (see Table 2b), PC voters seemed 
more pre-occupied with integrity/corruption (20 percent), and another quarter are split 
between public finances (18 percent) and jobs/economy (17 percent). 
Table 2b: Second-most important issues among voters   
      
Issue  Party supported    
 Lib. PC NDP  Total 
Jobs/Econ 13.4% 17.2% 13.1%  14.7% 
Healthcare 17.1% 10.3% 16.5%  14.5% 
Public finances 11.4% 17.9% 7.6%  12.8% 
Integrity/corruption 10.4% 20.1% 15.6%  15.1% 
Education 10.0% 2.0% 8.7%  6.8% 
Taxes 5.0% 10.8% 8.2%  7.8% 
Energy 6.2% 10.9% 10.4%  8.9% 
Transit, Roads, Transport 10.8% 4.3% 5.3%  7.1% 
Social Assist/pensions 9.8% 3.5% 9.4%  7.5% 
Environment 4.2% 1.3% 3.9%  3.1% 
Other 1.8% 1.7% 1.3%  1.7% 
      
 2991 2569 1826  7476  
Source: Ipsos Ontario 2014 Election Day Survey. 
  
 Integrity and corruption was also a top issue for the NDP. Given that the NDP and 
the PC are in opposition, it not surprising for this issue to rank relatively high, since the 
target of this issue is the incumbent Liberal party. However, even 10 percent of Liberal 
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voters cited this issue is a top concern, and another 10 percent cited as the second-most 
important issue. It cannot, therefore, be considered strictly an issue for the opposition. 
 
Media coverage 
We now focus our attention on the media’s role during the campaign. To a large extent, 
the outcome of an election depends heavily on how parties and candidates manage the 
narrative, and this directly implies media coverage. Here, we look at how the media 
covers the parties, leaders and issues. 
To conduct our analysis, we gathered news articles from six daily newspapers 
representing different regions of Ontario, and drawn from three different media 
conglomerates. The database Lexis-Nexis was searched for newspaper articles relevant to 
the campaign from the day the campaign began (May 2, 2014) to election day (June 12, 
2014). The number of stories that were in each newspaper are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3: Media coverage 
 
  Newspapers Frequency 
Globe and Mail 35 
Hamilton Spectator 102 
National Post 57 
Ottawa Citizen 50 
The Toronto Star 205 
Waterloo Region Record 91 
Windsor Star 34 
  
 One useful way of understanding how the news media covered a campaign relates 
to the differential way in which newspapers treated each leader, and in particular to the 
prominence given to each leader. The attention that is accorded to leaders can be a 
powerful resource in an election campaign. In the United States, candidates in 
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presidential primaries often go through what is known as a discovery phase (Sides and 
Vavreck 2014) where their share of the media coverage starts to rise as journalists begin 
to look into their record, issues and personality. The attention this produces leads to a rise 
in poll results. 
In the left panel of Figure 1, the number of articles per day in which the party 
leaders were mentioned first in is plotted. The right panel plots the raw number of 
mentions per day. There are a number of interesting patterns. First, throughout the entire 
campaign, the Liberal leader was mentioned first in news articles far more frequently 
than Hudak or Horwath. However, Hudak received just as many and, on quite a few days, 
more mentions than the other two leaders. The first finding is not surprising given the 
Liberals’ status as the incumbent party, but the second is more counterintuitive. One clue 
as to why it happened is in the dramatic increase in attention paid to Hudak at the end of 
the first week of the campaign, around May 10 to 12. The PCs announced their 
commitment to cut 100,000 public sector jobs May 9, and stories appeared immediately, 
provoking a strong reaction from union leaders and opposition parties. After this initial 
burst of attention, Hudak and Wynne were winning equal mentions until the final week of 
the campaign when Hudak again began receiving slightly more mentions than Wynne. 
We measured the media’s issue agenda by taking the issue dictionaries developed 
as part of the Lexicoder automated coding software project.1
 In this case, they have been modified somewhat to capture unique dynamics of 
the 2014 campaign. Moreover, we only used the dictionaries that purport to measure 
macroeconomics, healthcare, energy, government operations, transportation and social 
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welfare. Macroeconomics and healthcare are included because of their consistently 
general importance in election campaigns. 
 
 
Figure 1: Party and leader mentions in media coverage 
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As shown in Figure 2, in the pre-campaign period, transportation issues were at 
the top of the media’s agenda reflecting the incumbent party’s ability to use the tools of 
government to set the agenda with various announcements. Knowing an election was 
imminent, the Liberals were able to set the agenda with announcements about transit 
projects, committing $29 billion to transit funding over 10 years in April, including 
commitments for new subway and rail lines in the Greater Toronto Area. This had the 
dual effect of overshadowing media coverage about the lingering concerns about how the 
Liberals had managed (or mismanaged) the cancellation of contracts to construct two gas 
plants in Oakville and Mississauga. Note that newspaper stories dedicated far greater 
attention to transportation issues prior to the campaign’s start than they did to energy 
issues (i.e., gas plants). However, media attention to transportation issues faded in the 
first few days of the election campaign, while the general issue of government operations 
– which we defined with the terms public sector, civil service and public service – 
increased in importance, largely because of Hudak’s promise to eliminate 100,000 public 
sector positions. It is important to note that the promise to eliminate these jobs was not 
associated with a lot of positive coverage. We computed a few simple correlation scores 
between an article’s overall sentiment with the frequency of issue mentions.2 The more 
an article dealt with transportation, the more positive its sentiment (r=.13, p<.001), but 
results were less convincing when an article dealt with government operations (i.e. 
Hudak’s promise to eliminate public-sector positions). Here, the correlation was much 
weaker (r=.07), and only marginally significant (p≈.09). 
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Figure 2: Issues in media coverage 
 
The consequences of these decisions cannot be overestimated. In order to shift 
discussion away from lingering concerns about the gas plants, the Liberals promised 
massive amounts of investment in transit. This pushed the gas plant scandal off the pages 
of the newspapers. Then, rather than trying to focus the agenda back onto a troubling 
scandal about Liberal behaviour, the Conservatives opened up a new front in the 
campaign with a dramatic announcement to eliminate massive numbers of public sector 
positions. Not surprisingly, such an announcement did not deliver any positive media 
coverage.  
 
Campaign dynamics 
Our look at voter sentiments towards the parties takes into account the period before the 
actual campaign. Figure 3 shows the parties’ poll numbers from January, 2014, until the 
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end of the campaign. Also on the graph are three vertical lines to indicate key events, 
namely: 1) dissolution of the provincial parliament on May 2; Tim Hudak’s job-cuts 
announcement on May 9; and the televised leaders’ debate on June 2. 
 
Figure 3: Voting intentions, May to June, 2014 
 
Pre-campaign period polls show little movement in public support for the major 
parties. Overall, the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives took turns at the lead, but 
never was either in the lead by a wide margin. In addition, the New Democratic Party 
also found itself close in popularity to the other two parties, although over the months the 
NDP’s poll numbers continued to weaken. 
The NDP, which held the balance of power for the minority Liberals, did not 
seem to benefit from this role. The NDP announced its intent to not support the Liberal’s 
budget, tabled for June. This would have forced a vote of non-confidence. Premier 
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Wynne, instead, proactively had the legislature dissolved on May 2, thereby kicking off 
the election campaign and controlling its timing to some degree. This announcement by 
the NDP to oppose the budget seemed to have done little to reverse the NDP’s fortunes.  
The PCs, too, failed to exploit the campaign period effectively. Over time, its 
support declined. One possible reason may be Hudak’s announcement to eliminate 
100,000 public-sector jobs. It was an announcement that backfired and forced Hudak to 
issue revised statements. He did not retract that announcement, as public sector cuts fall 
within the general orientations of right-of-centre parties. But the manner in which this 
announcement was handled may have forced the PCs into a position of managing a 
communications crisis, while the Liberals were able to get their message out more 
consistently. 
The other key event was the televised leaders’ debate. Following this event, the 
two opposition parties saw an improvement in their poll numbers. The NDP’s had 
support from 19 percent of voters prior to the debate, rising upward to the mid-20s 
afterwards. The PCs, too, saw modest gains, from the low 30s to the mid-30s. The 
Liberals, on the other hand, showed a slight decline. Their pre-debate poll numbers 
hovered from 36 to 38 percent, dipping to 34 percent in the following days. None of this 
mattered as the campaign ended with the Liberals capturing 39 percent of the popular 
vote, enough to win a majority of seats. The PCs and NDP captured 31 and 24 percent of 
the vote, respectively. 
However, the election victory is based on fairly modest shifts among the 
electorate. The improvement in popular vote for the victorious Liberals was no greater 
than for the NDP. Both gained a bare one percentage point compared to their 2011 
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performance. The perspective is a little different in absolute terms. First, turnout was 
higher in 2015, 52.1 percent compared to 49.2 percent in 2011. Within this shift, it 
appears the net loser was the PC. The Liberals gained almost 239,000 more votes 
compared to 2011, the NDP gained 163,300. The PC’s loss of 21,000 votes in an election 
with far more voters translated to the party’s four percentage points decline. These shifts 
in support levels account for the seat shifts that cost the Conservatives nine members, and 
transformed the legislature into a majority for Kathleen Wynne. 
 
Voter dynamics and partisan support 
Despite the Liberals’ modest gains, it is worthy to look at where the party drew much of 
its support. Table 4 presents a multinomial logistic regression model to examine the 
relationship of a battery socio-demographic factors and issue priorities against the three 
main parties. Vote for the Liberal Party is set as the base category. Table 5 converts these 
models into vote probabilities using the Stata module Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg and 
King 2003). Here are some notable observations. 
First, there is an apparent gender gap in voting, in a direction consistent with other 
findings in Canadian voting research (e.g., Gidengil et al., 2012). The probability of 
females voting for the Liberals was .45, compared to .37 among males. An even bigger 
gender gap is evident for the PC vote model. The probability of voting PC among females 
was .29, compared to .42 among males, a 13-point difference. The gender gap for the 
NDP points to the opposite direction, and is of a smaller magnitude. The probability of 
voting NDP was .26 and females, .20 among men.  
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Table 4: Multinomial logistic regression model for vote choice 
         
  
Conservative 
 
New Democratic Party 
  
Coef. S.E. Sig. 
 
Coef. S.E. Sig. 
Female -.394 .068 .000 
 
.095 .073 .195 
Immigrant .146 .086 .091 
 
-.066 .096 .491 
Religion 
       
 
Catholic -.201 .125 .109 
 
-.133 .129 .303 
 
Mainstream protestant .156 .122 .201 
 
-.076 .129 .560 
 
Evangelical protestant .636 .139 .000 
 
.029 .152 .848 
 
No religion -.335 .128 .009 
 
.058 .128 .652 
Urban -.188 .077 .015 
 
-.040 .083 .630 
Age 
       
 
18 to 34 -.094 .138 .493 
 
.037 .124 .768 
 
54 and up -.042 .082 .605 
 
-.443 .084 .000 
Union member -.602 .093 .000 
 
.487 .084 .000 
Education 
       
 
Low .371 .212 .080 
 
-.025 .226 .912 
 
High -.668 .100 .000 
 
-.605 .103 .000 
Income 
       
 
Low -.014 .087 .870 
 
.322 .087 .000 
 
High -.092 .081 .257 
 
-.563 .090 .000 
Region 
       
 
Toronto -.580 .112 .000 
 
-.163 .118 .167 
 
GTA/"905" -.163 .094 .082 
 
-.322 .111 .004 
 
Southwestern Ontario -.033 .087 .703 
 
.682 .091 .000 
Issue priorities 
       
 
Jobs/Economy .328 .071 .000 
 
-.164 .075 .029 
 
Healthcare -.555 .088 .000 
 
-.047 .082 .568 
 
Public finances 1.133 .078 .000 
 
-.353 .104 .001 
 
Integrity/corruption .799 .074 .000 
 
.561 .079 .000 
Intercept .391 .185 .035 
 
.134 .194 .491 
         N 
 
5842 
      Log likelihood -5512.250 
      Psuedo R-sq. .126 
      
         Note: Vote for the Liberal Party is the base category. 
    Source: Ipsos Ontario 2014 Election Day Survey. 
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Table 5: Vote probabilities  
       
         
 
Liberals PC NDP   Liberals PC NDP 
Male .40 .39 .21  Low income .37 .31 .32 
Female .45 .30 .26  Middle income .41 .34 .25 
 
    High income .47 .36 .17 
Canadian born .43 .33 .24      Immigrant .41 .37 .22  Urban .44 .32 .24 
 
    
Rural/smaller 
urban .40 .36 .23 
Catholic .46 .30 .23      Main. Prot. .41 .38 .22  Toronto .51 .27 .22 
Evangelical Prot. .32 .48 .19  GTA/"905" .46 .37 .17 
No relig. .46 .26 .28  SWO .34 .31 .34 
Other rel. .42 .33 .24  Other .41 .38 .21 
 
    
 
   
Aged 18 to 34 .40 .30 .30  Jobs/economy .47 .31 .22 
Aged 35 to 50 .44 .35 .21  Healthcare .55 .15 .30 
Aged 54+ .39 .32 .29  Public finances .35 .51 .14 
 
    Integrity/corruption .33 .35 .32 
Union membership .43 .21 .36  Other .49 .23 .28 
Non-union .41 .37 .21      
 
    
    Low education .26 .51 .23      Mid-level education .30 .42 .28      Highly educated .46 .32 .23       
Second, religion shows some influence. The probability of voting Liberal among 
Catholics and those who practice no religion reached .46. Mainstream Protestants split 
their vote between the two major parties, although the PCs seems to have drawn far more 
support among Evangelical Protestants (p=.50).3 
Third, education is an important driver. Education in the models is measured as a 
set of dummies. The first assigns a score of 1 to those with less than a high school 
education. The second dummy variable assigns a 1 to those with post-secondary 
education. The more one is educated, the higher the probability of voting Liberal, by a 
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fairly wide margin. An even larger margin is evident among those with less than a high 
school education, which overwhelmingly favours the PC. What explains this is unclear. 
Education and vote choice in Canada does not form clear and consistent patterns 
(Gidengil et al., 2012), although there is some European research that shows an inverse 
relationship between educational attainment and support for right-wing parties, 
particularly those in the far-right (see, for example, Lubbers and Tolsma 2011; Lucassen 
and Lubbers 2012; Mayer 2013). While the PC party is no example of a far-right party, 
some policy positions taken by the party over the years resonate with rhetoric familiar to 
that end of the ideological spectrum, such as in 2011 when Hudak’s criticism of a 
proposed Liberal tax credit to encourage hiring new Canadians as a policy to advantage 
“foreign workers” (Brennan 2011). 
Fourth, region is a major factor, about as impactful as education. Torontonians 
were more likely to vote Liberal (p = .51) than PC (p=.27) or NDP (p=.22). Actually, 
urban voters (measured here as respondents who lived in a city with a population of at 
least 1 million), overall, were more likely to vote Liberal (p =.44), while those who live 
in smaller communities split between the Liberals and PC. However, Liberal support in 
the Greater Toronto “905” region also edged out the PCs, an important finding if one 
assumes the “905” region identifies as mainly suburban. The result suggests that the 
suburban vote is not a guaranteed block of support for the PCs, challenging some 
previous findings (see, for example, Roy, Perrella and Borden 2015).4  
These regional findings are supported in Table 6, which shows actual vote shares 
for the parties in the various regions for both the 2011 and 2014 elections. The PCs, 
which in 2011 had won 36 percent of the vote in the mostly suburban Greater Toronto 
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Area, saw their vote proportions drop five points to 31 in 2014. These votes split fairly 
evenly among the Liberals, NDP and other parties. But the Liberals’ most secure base is 
in Toronto. The PCs, on the other hand, rely mainly on voters in Eastern and 
Southwestern Ontario, while the NDP does well in the North, as well as Southwestern 
Ontario.  
Table 6: Party vote shares among Ontario regions, 2014 
     Region Liberal PC NDP Other 
East 38.2% 38.2% 16.9% 6.8% 
GTA 45.0% 31.3% 18.6% 5.2% 
Hamilton-Niagara 34.4% 31.0% 28.7% 5.9% 
North 34.9% 18.2% 42.4% 4.5% 
Southwestern 28.6% 34.8% 28.6% 8.0% 
Toronto 49.1% 23.0% 22.4% 5.5% 
  
Perhaps the largest overall set of factors is issues. The largest coefficient in Table 
4, and the largest probability score in Table 5, concern two issues that favoured the PC 
party. The PC’s “issue base” was mainly centred on public finances, an issue traditionally 
pursued by conservatives (e.g., low taxes, cuts to government expenditures), and 
integrity, given the party’s incessant criticism of the Liberals on a number of scandals. 
However, those for whom healthcare was a top issue – and this was a top issue, overall – 
were far more likely to have voted Liberal. No issues on this list was favourable to the 
NDP. It should be noted that, as previously mentioned, the list of issues offered in the 
Ipsos survey is much longer, but, as noted, these were not selected by a large proportion 
of the sample. 
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Conclusion 
It is natural for winning parties to make various self-serving claims in interpreting their 
triumph, about how it was a mandate for this or that. However, there should not be any 
misunderstanding that this election was more Hudak's loss than a victory for Wynne. 
Indeed, it is difficult to remember any Liberal theme pitched in their television ads, apart 
from the 100,000 job cuts. What makes the outcome particularly compelling and ironic is 
that it was the third consecutive Ontario election where the Conservatives have blown a 
lead with some half-baked policy idea that blew up in their faces. Preceding examples 
include John Tory's proposal to extend the denominational school system in 2007 
(Perrella et al. 2008), and Hudak's ruminations criticizing programs for foreign-born 
workers in 2011 (Kiss, Perrella and Kay 2014). 
This election has also marked the evolution and extension of a curious trend of 
distinctive regional voting patterns in the province that is not fully understood. For some 
time we have observed a cleavage between large urban centres where the PCs do poorly, 
and the rural and smaller communities where they do very well. However, this election 
uncovered new regional effects such as the NDP underperforming in the city of Toronto, 
when they were modestly improving province wide. Also a similar dramatic decline for 
the Liberals in southwestern Ontario (it got worse the closer one got to Windsor) even 
while they were gaining in most other places. 
Kathleen Wynne now leading a majority government has her future secure for the 
next four years. NDP leader Andrea Horwath also survived a leadership review shortly 
after the election, and will likely face another election campaign. The PCs, however, have 
chosen a new leader, Patrick Brown, who hopes to steer the party to success in the next 
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general election. However, the next election will be fought along new battle lines. An 
impending seat redistribution will likely add another 15 constituencies adjacent to the 
largest urban centres, where the PCs typically perform poorly. They must now appeal to 
416 and 905 voters. 
One lesson the Tories should have gleaned from this election is not to stray too far 
from the moderate centre in pushing austerity proposals. The ghost of Mike Harris still 
lingers. Ironically, the NDP, while losing their policy leverage in the new Liberal 
majority legislature, will be able to adopt a more comfortable posture on the left, and 
return to opposing rather than making excuses for sustaining the Wynne government. 
This comfort level will also allow them to heal differences with the party's ideological 
purists like Judy Rebick and Gerry Caplan, who nostalgically long for the days when it 
was more of a fringe movement with half the current complement of seats. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Lexicoder topic dictionaries were based on Albugh et al. (2013).  
2 To calculate each article’s sentiment, we used the NRC Emotion Lexicon prepared by 
Mohammad and Turney (2013) to calculate a net sentiment score for each article.  
3 Three Protestant denominations are considered “mainstream:” United Church of 
Canada, Anglican, Presbyterian. Most other Protestant sects are Evangelicals. A small 
number (e.g., Mennonites, Jehovah Witness) are excluded. For more details on this 
conceptualization, see Kay, Perrella and Brown (2009). 
4 It should be noted that the Roy, Perrella and Borden’s study is based on a survey that 
has a more direct question that identifies where a respondents lives: “Do you live in an 
urban, suburban, or rural environment?” In contrast, Ipsos election-day poll asks 
respondents to identify their community from four choices, based on population: rural 
(population less than 50,000), small town (50,000 to under 250,000 people), large city 
(250,000 to 1 million people), or metropolitan (at least 1 million people). 
